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Shaky Ground  
 
William Simkulet 
 
 
The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the 
most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not 
have to be.  At its heart, the free will debate is a metaethical debate - a 
debate about the meaning of certain moral terms - free will, moral 
responsibility, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness. Compatibilists argue 
that these concepts are compatible with wholly deterministic world, 
while incompatibilists argue that these concepts require indeterminism, 
or multiple possible futures. However, compatibilists and 
incompatibilists do not disagree on everything - both parties agree that 
free will and moral responsibility require control - the kind of control 
that we believe we have over the majority of our everyday actions.  Over 
the course of any given day each of us makes countless choices, and in 
most situations as we make these choices we cannot help but believe that 
we are in control of them - that our actions are free and we are morally 
responsible for them. Here I argue that our concepts of free will and 
moral responsibility are inexorably tied to this experience of apparent 
liberty. 
 
Introduction 
 
Susan opens her refrigerator looking for a midnight snack and spots a batch of Christmas 
cookies that her sister, Mary, had cooked the day before explicitly exclusively for their 
Christmas party the following day. Susan likes cookies. It occurs to her that she can do one 
of two things - either take a cookie, or not take a cookie.  
 
Over the course of any given day each of us are confronted with countless situations like 
the one described above - situations in which it appears to us as if we have multiple 
possible options and that we are free to choose amongst them. The vast majority of 
choices we make are such that - at least as we make them - we cannot help but believe 
that our choices are entirely up to us, that we are the determining factor between two or 
more possible series of events, that we could choose to initiate any of these series of 
events, and that we can choose to act for reasons - or without regard to reasons at all. To 
choose in this manner is to act freely, or to exercise one’s free will. Furthermore, we cannot 
help but believe that we are truly morally responsible for these choices (such that it would 
be appropriate to praise or blame us for these actions) because we believe that we are the 
authors of these choices. 
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 One of the most seemingly intractable debates in philosophy - the free will debate 
- is a metaethical debate, or a debate about the meaning of moral terms - in this case free 
will and moral responsibility.1 A satisfactory metaethical theory is a theory that defines 
terms in a manner consistent with how we actually use them, and it is in situations like 
that described above in which we are likely to describe ourselves as exercising our free 
will and being morally responsible as a result. 
 The major point of contention in the free will debate is about whether or not our 
concepts of free will and moral responsibility are compatible with the theory of universal 
causal determinism, where universal causal determinism is the theory that the actual past, 
coupled with the laws of nature, determine the future. If determinism is true, at any 
given time there is only one possible future - the actual future. Compatibilists contend that 
free will and moral responsibility are compatible with universal causal determinism, 
while incompatibilists contend that free will and moral responsibility are not.2 Both sides 
 
 
1 It is important to distinguish between an agent being morally responsible from our being morally 
justified in judging an agent to be morally responsible. It is generally accepted that one’s moral 
responsibility for their actions depends in no small part on the intentions and beliefs one had when 
acting.  Indeed, we're very likely to revise our judgments of moral responsibility when we learn 
more about the agent’s beliefs, intentions, or ability to do otherwise. For example, see William 
Simkulet, ‘On Moral Enhancement’, American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3:4 (2012), pp. 17-18, 
and ‘In Control’, Philosophical Inquires 2:1 (2014), pp. 59-75. The metaethical inquiry in this paper 
will focus on moral responsibility, and not judgments of moral responsibility. 
2 Semicompatibilists, like John Martin Fischer, contend that while moral responsibility is compatible 
with determinism, free will is not.  See John Martin Fischer, ‘Responsibility and Control’, Journal of 
Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 24-40; John Martin Fischer, ‘As Go the Frankfurt Examples, so Goes 
Deontic Morality’, Journal of Ethics 4 (2000), pp. 361-363; John Martin Fischer, ‘The Importance of 
Frankfurt-Style Argument’, Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2007a), pp. 464-471; John Martin Fischer, 
Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, Four Views on Free Will (Walden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007); John Martin Fischer, ‘The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories’, Philosophical 
Review 119 (2010), pp. 315-336. However, insofar as most of us would likely revise our judgments of 
moral responsibility when we discover an agent lacks free will, this view is substantially at odds 
with how we actually use moral terminology (see Simkulet ‘On Moral Enhancement’ and ‘In 
Control’). Revisionsists argue that we ought to revise our concepts of free will and moral 
responsibility, usually so that they fit in with our now, largely deterministic scientific view of the 
world. See Vargas 2007.  Because this paper is interested in metaethics, revisionism is outside the 
scope of this paper. For compatibilist theories, see Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free 
Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984); Harry G. Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities 
and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 66:23 (1969), pp. 829-839; Harry G. Frankfurt, 
‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), pp. 5-20; Harry G. 
Frankfurt, ‘Some Thoughts Concerning PAP’, in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities 
Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, [2003] 2006), pp. 339-345; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by 
L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edition, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1739-1740] 
1975); David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd 
edition, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1751] 1975); David Hunt, ‘Moral 
Responsibility and Unavoidable Action’, Philosophical Studies 97 (2000), pp. 195–227; David Hunt, 
‘Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005), pp. 126–
145; Peter F. Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British Academy XLVIII (1962), 
pp. 1-25. 
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in the debate generally accept that moral responsibility requires control of some sort, and 
this control comes with free will. 
 Libertarianism is, roughly, the theory that the experience of apparent liberty 
described in the case above are largely veridical and capture a relevant, indeterministic 
feature of our decision making process. According to the libertarian, if Susan has free 
will, then she doesn’t just believe that she can either take the cookie or not take the 
cookie, but that she actually can chose to do either. Libertarians are incompatibilists who 
believe that (i) incompatibilism is true - free will and moral responsibility are 
incompatible with determinism, (ii) determinism is false, and (iii) free will and moral 
responsibility are possible in the actual world.3 
 Many philosophers believe that experiences like Susan’s are illusory, ‘false 
sensation[s]’ of liberty,4 requiring an ‘obscure and panicky metaphysics’.5 Most 
compatibilists believe determinism is true at the actual world, and these compatibilists 
are committed to the proposition that Susan is, in an important sense, wrong - there are 
no alternate possible futures and her choice about whether or not she would take the 
cookie was determined long before she was even born.6 None of us, they contend, can do 
anything but what we actually do. 
 The primary way in which analytic philosophers endeavor to discover truth 
about concepts like free will and moral responsibility is to see how we employ these 
concepts in actual and hypothetical situations.7 This method assumes that the ways in 
 
 
3 Libertarians can be contrasted with hard incompatibilists who believe that free will and moral 
responsibility are incompatible with either determinism or indeterminism, and hard determinists, 
incompatibilists who believe determinism is true and thus free will and moral responsibility are not 
possible in the actual world. For an example of hard incompatibilism, see Galen Strawson, ‘The 
Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 5-24; Derk Pereboom, 
‘Defending Hard Incompatibilism’, Midwest Studies 29 (2005), pp. 228-247; Derk Pereboom, 
‘Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again‘, in Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by 
Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2008), pp. 1-33.  
4 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2.3.2.2. 
5 P. F. Strawson, p. 25. 
6 Some incompatibilist philosophers, such as Robert Kane, also reject the idea that our experiences 
accurately reflect the world. For Kane, free will and moral responsibility require only small, 
momentary bouts of indeterminism.  See Robert Kane, Free Will and Values (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1985); Robert Kane, ‘Two Kinds of Incompatibilism’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 50 (1989), pp. 219-254; Robert Kane, ‘Free Will: The Elusive Ideal’, 
Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 25-60; Robert Kane, ‘Freedom, Responsibility, and Will-Setting’, 
Philosophical Topics 24:2 (1996), pp. 67-90; Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996); Robert Kane, ‘On Free Will, Responsibility and Indeterminism’, 
Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999), pp. 105-121; Robert Kane, ‘Agency, Responsibility, and 
Indeterminism: Reflections on Libertarian Theories of Free Will’, in Freedom and Determinism, edited 
by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and David Shier (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2004), pp. 70–88; Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas. 
7 Recently experimental philosophers have attempted to gather experimental data about how we 
utilize our concepts of free will and moral responsibility. In Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, 
Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner, ’Surveying Freedom Folk Intuitions about Free Will and 
Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Psychology 18:5 (2005), pp. 561-584, Nahmias et al. purport to 
show that we have compatibilist intuitions.  In Shawn Nichols and Joshua Knobe, ‘Moral 
Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions’, Nous 41 (2007), pp. 663-
685, Nichols and Knobe offer a definitive criticism of Nahmias et al., showing that we have largely 
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8 
which we come to form our beliefs and practices are veridical and capture relevant truths 
about the world. Compatibilists and incompatibilists alike employ this method to 
construct and defend theories of free will and moral responsibility; each argues that their 
theories are as consistent, or more consistent, with our application of the concepts than 
competing theories. 
 In this article I argue that compatibilists cannot justify employing this method to 
defend their account of free will and moral responsibility. I argue that our concepts of 
free will and moral responsibility are founded on our experiences of apparent liberty - 
experiences like Susan’s apparent ability to choose either to take a cookie or refrain from 
taking a cookie - and thus are inexorably tied to these experiences. These experiences are 
the experiences in which compatibilist and incompatibilist alike are inclined to say that 
the agent is both free and morally responsible in the relevant senses. If one argues, as the 
compatibilist does, that these experiences fail to accurately describe the world, then one 
has no reason to think that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility are 
applicable to the actual world. Instead, the would-be compatibilist has every reason to 
believe that our application of these concepts is erroneous, merely the result illusory 
experiences.8 
 This article is divided into two sections. In the first, I argue that our beliefs about 
free will and moral responsibility, and the applications of these concepts, are based upon 
our near constant stream of experiences of apparent liberty. As a libertarian, I believe that 
these experiences accurately reflect the world, however defending the veridicality of 
these experiences is outside the scope of this work. In the second, I consider several 
compatibilist responses, and argue that they fail to justify their appeal to our beliefs and 
practices about free will and moral responsibility. 
 
 
Free Will as Apparent Liberty 
 
In ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’, Galen Strawson describes an example of 
the kind of experience that he contends serves as the foundation for our beliefs about 
moral responsibility: 
 
Suppose you set off for a shop on the evening of a national holiday, intending to buy a cake 
with your last ten pound note. On the steps of the shop someone is shaking an Oxfam tin. 
You stop, and it seems completely clear to you that is it entirely up to you what you do next. 
That is, it seems to you that you are truly, radically free to choose, in such a way that you 
will be ultimately morally responsible for whatever you choose. Even if you believe that 
determinism is true, and that you will in five minutes time be able to look back and say 
what you did was determined, this does not seem to undermine your sense of the 
 
 
incompatibilist intuitions, and that our compatibilist intuitions are restricted to emotional 
judgments of moral responsibility of the kind that are subject to revision.  
8 By the same reasoning, incompatibilist theories that deny our experiences of libertarian free will 
accurately reflect the world cannot reasonably appeal to our moral beliefs derived from those 
experiences. See Kane, Free Will and Values; Kane, ‘Two Kinds of Incompatibilism’; Kane, ‘Free Will: 
The Elusive Ideal’; Kane, ‘Freedom, Responsibility, and Will-Setting’; Kane, The Significance of Free 
Will; Kane, ‘On Free Will, Responsibility and Indeterminism’; Kane, ‘Agency, Responsibility, and 
Indeterminism’; Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas. 
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9 
absoluteness and inescapability of your freedom, and of your moral responsibility for your 
choice.9  
 
Strawson’s description of this kind of experience is especially compelling in that he 
focuses on our inability to interpret such experiences otherwise. This is to say that the 
beliefs we form on the basis of this experience are not merely misapprehensions of the 
experience that go away once we come to accept that universal causal determinism (or 
something sufficiently like it) is true. Rather it seems as though in that moment even the 
most stalwart and resolute of determinists cannot interpret their experiences as anything 
but experiences of libertarian free will.  
 Strawson’s example focuses on a situation where we have a clear choice between 
two mutually exclusive options, and reasons in favor of either option. However, it seems 
uncontroversially true that we experience this kind of freedom in regards to the vast 
majority of our choices, from deciding what clothes we wear, to the food we eat, to the 
route we take to work. These experiences of apparent liberty are almost unrelenting, and 
in each situation where we have such experiences, we believe we act freely. Furthermore, 
the concept of free will seems to be inexorably tied to these experiences; in hypothetical 
scenarios where we stipulate that, contrary to our understanding of events, our 
experiences fail to accurately represent our decision making process, we tend to retract 
our belief that we had free will. Consider the following case: 
 
Black wants Jones to steal Ann’s car, and implants him with a device.  If Jones is 
going to choose to steal the car on his own, the device does nothing.  Otherwise, 
the device does two things – it (a) causally determines Jones to steal Ann’s car, and 
(b) forces Jones to have the false experience of believing he can do otherwise 
despite being wholly causally determined to steal the car by the device. As it so 
happens, the device activates, Jones steals the car and experiences a false sensation 
of liberty.10  
 
Although Jones cannot help but believe that he exercises his free will when he choses to 
steal Ann’s car, it is uncontroversially true that he did not do so. If Jones were to learn of 
the device, he’d abandon his belief that he had exercised his free will. 
 Just as the concept of free will is tied to our experiences of liberty, so too is the 
concept of moral responsibility. Galen Strawson says our experiences of liberty ‘are the 
experiential rock on which the belief in true moral responsibility is founded’.11 Strawson 
 
 
9 G. Strawson, p. 10. 
10 This case is a variant on Harry Frankfurt’s infamous purported counterexample to the principle 
of alternate possibilities (Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’), based on a 
version constructed by Alfred Mele and David Robb (‘Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases’, Philosophical 
Review 107:1 (1998), pp. 97-112). Frankfurt admits that in his famous case, Jones has alternate 
possibilities (Frankfurt, ‘Some Thoughts Concerning PAP’); he can either do as Black secretly wants 
him to of his own accord, or be wholly causally determined to do so by Black’s device.  This is to 
say that he can do one of two things. Frankfurt’s contention is that the alternate possibilities play no 
role in determining Jones’ responsibility… but none the less, they appear to be a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for us to find Jones morally responsible. 
11 G. Strawson, p. 11. 
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claims that to be truly morally responsible for something is for it to ‘make sense’ for one to be 
rewarded in heaven or punished in hell for that something; he goes on to say  
 
The stress on the words ‘makes sense’ is important, for one certainly does not have to 
believe in any version of the story of heaven and hell in order to understand the notion of 
true moral responsibility that it is being used to illustrate.12  
 
That so many people do believe in this story, or at least find it compelling, does, however, 
count as evidence that Strawson’s account of true moral responsibility is an accurate theory 
of the concept of moral responsibility. 
 The reason why it makes sense to hold us morally responsible for our actions, if 
our experiences are correct, is because we believe that we are non-arbitrary, competent, 
indeterministic sources of our actions. This is to say that we believe we can act for 
reasons and that we have a reasonable idea about the consequences of our actions, all else 
being equal. Thus, all else being equal, the bad consequences of someone’s actions are 
evidence that person intended to bring about those bad consequences. To freely intend to 
bring about bad consequences when you can easily avoid doing so is inherently 
blameworthy, and thus it makes sense to hold such a person morally blameworthy for 
her actions. Similarly, anyone who freely intends to bring about good consequences is 
prima facie praiseworthy.  
 This brings us to what Strawson calls ‘The basic argument’; Strawson believes 
this argument precludes the possibility that anyone could ever be truly morally 
responsible for their actions. The argument goes like this: 
 
(1) Nothing can be a causa sui – nothing can be a cause of itself. 
(2) In order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions one would have to be    
      causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects. 
(3) Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible.13  
 
The problem with the basic argument is that our experience of liberty is not one of being 
a causa sui; we do not believe that we cause ourselves.14 Rather we believe that we are the 
authors and causes of our choices.  The objection here is that nothing can cause itself to 
act; but true moral responsibility doesn’t require this either. Our choices are often 
explicitly prompted by external circumstances, but we believe other experiences might 
just as well constitute inexplicit prompts. In Strawson’s case, our (mechanistic) 
perception of the shaking of the Oxfam tin prompts us to act; however if our experience 
is to be believed, this prompt in no way determines what our choice will be. 
 The prompt thesis maintains that although moral agents are the enduring, non-
arbitrary causes of their actions, every choice they make needs to be prompted by some 
experiential stimulus, internal or external. Stimuli may range from brain events to 
 
 
12 G. Strawson, pp. 9-10. 
13 Ibid., p. 5. 
14 My criticism here of the basic argument is not meant to be a defense of libertarianism - such a 
defense is outside the scope of this paper; rather it is a clarification of the kind of causation required 
for our experiences of apparent liberty to be true. Free will doesn't require us to be our own 
grandparents, it requires us to be free to respond to moral challenges. 
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 1:3 (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
thoughts to sensory experiences to even our experience of time passing.  Stimuli can be 
deterministic or indeterministic in nature.   
 One objection to the prompt thesis is that it is prima facie inconsistent with some 
of our experiences that we describe as spontaneous. However, upon reflection, this 
doesn’t seem to be the case. For example, upon hearing the shaking of the Oxfam tin, we 
are presented by our understanding of the situation with certain obvious options – we 
can (a) buy a cake, or (b) give our money to the Oxfam tin shaker. However, all else being 
equal, we are equally free to (c) buy cake for the less fortunate, (d) go home, and so on. 
These options are less obvious, less attentive to the scenario, but no less within our power 
– or at least so we believe. Our choices are, at least in part, limited by our imagination in 
the same way they are limited by other circumstances. We cannot freely choose to do 
things that we don’t think of, or that we don’t think are possible. A prisoner cannot freely 
choose to turn into a bird and fly out the window, although he may be free to try. 
 Much as we believe we are free to go ‘off script’ in the Oxfam tin scenario, we 
may be equally free to act spontaneously towards any number of mundane prompts, 
such as our experience of the passage of time. Unlike the Oxfam tin scenario, our 
experience of the passage of time doesn’t demand a response of any particular kind, and 
as such any response to this prompt will feel spontaneous and unplanned despite being 
prompted. 
 David Hume famously criticized libertarian free will as being undesirable 
because it is a liberty of indifference, where our actions are made arbitrarily, by chance.15 
But this is not how we experience our choices; we feel as if we can act for reasons without 
being casually determined by them. After choosing to donate his last ten pound note to 
the Oxfam tin shaker, a determinist may be able to look back and convince herself that 
she was causally determined to do so by her empathy; but had she chosen, instead, to 
buy the cake, she may just as easily convince herself that she was causally determined to 
do so by her desire to eat cake. Intuitively, though, we find both reasons prima facie 
compelling and cannot help but believe – at the time – that we could act on either set of 
reasons, and that to do so wouldn’t be arbitrary. This is not an experience of indifference. 
 Critics of libertarianism, justifiably, argue that such an experience is incoherent.  
For any choice, either we do so for reasons or we do not.  If we do not, they are arbitrary.  
We claim that we experience the capacity to choose between sets of reasons non-
arbitrarily, but to do so would mean that we have a separate reason to justify our 
choosing one set of reasons over the other. Choosing to act on that reason over competing 
reasons, too, is either arbitrary, or it is not. Either (a) it’s reasons all the way down, such 
that we get an infinite regress, (b) there is one or more self-justifying reasons somewhere 
down the line, which suggests determinism, or (c) at some point our choice between 
reasons is arbitrary. This is a rather convincing argument against the veridicality of our 
experience of liberty, but all the worse for any compatibilist hoping to save the concepts 
of free will and moral responsibility from the chopping block. 
 As a libertarian I feel obliged to offer a quick response to this criticism.  Much as 
we draw a distinction between deterministic events and indeterministic events, we draw 
a distinction between arbitrary events and non-arbitrary events. Almost everyone 
believes that deterministic events can be either arbitrary or non-arbitrary, yet the criticism 
above turns on indeterministic events being solely arbitrary. But almost everyone 
 
 
15 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature; Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.  
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believes this is false; we all seem to accept the possibility of non-arbitrary indeterministic 
events. For example, if there was indeterminacy in the buckshot pattern from a shotgun, 
the pattern wouldn’t necessarily be arbitrary – if the shotgun was successfully aimed at 
an intruder, much of the buckshot would find its way to the intruder, and there’s a rather 
specific reason it would do so – because the gun was aimed at him. Thus, the above 
criticism is less convincing than we might initially think; our experience of apparently 
non-arbitrary indeterminism is not incoherent.16    
 In the same way that we experience apparent liberty, sometimes we also 
experience apparent determinism, in which our actions are uncontroversially said to be 
wholly causally determined by instinct or character. In the case of instinct, it doesn’t 
make sense to hold us morally responsible since it is outside of our control. Similarly, 
when the character that determined us to act is the result of factors outside of our control, 
we don’t think we’re responsible or our actions; although we may still lament our having 
such a bad character, and attempt to change it. Indeed, we believe that we have some 
control over our character traits, such that we can train ourselves to either gain or lose 
certain traits. If these beliefs are correct, it makes sense to hold us derivatively morally 
responsible for actions causally determined by freely acquired character traits because we 
are truly morally responsible for the free actions which brought about those traits and 
had a good idea what kind of actions those traits would bring about. To be derivatively 
morally responsible for x is to be truly morally responsible for y, where y plays a relevant 
causal role in bringing about x. According to this framework, we are truly morally 
responsible for our free actions, and derivatively morally responsible for the 
consequences that follow. 
 In this section I’ve argued that our experience of apparent liberty leads us to 
believe that we have non-arbitrary, competent, undetermined control over many of our 
actions such that it makes sense to hold us truly morally responsible for them – to punish 
us for the harms we freely bring about, and praise us for the good we freely bring about 
because it’s ultimately up to us what we do when we act freely.   
 Note that the concept of true moral responsibility discussed here is distinct from 
many other common concepts that may play a similar role in our lives; concepts like legal 
responsibility, causal responsibility, and what I call practical responsibility, the feature of it 
being practical to treat something in a similar way to how one might treat something that 
is morally responsible. Consider the following case: 
 
Mary has contracted a highly contagious and dangerous disease through no fault 
of her own.  Fortunately for her, she is merely a carrier and shows no symptoms, 
although she can still spread it to others. 
 
I think most of us would agree that Mary has a strong moral obligation not to infect 
others, and to quarantine herself if possible. However, it is practical to not give her the 
option – after all, she might choose otherwise. Suppose the Center for Disease Control 
were to swoop in, abduct Mary, and quarantine her until a cure could be discovered.  It is 
practical to treat Mary in this way, but it is uncontroversially true that she doesn’t 
deserve it. This practicality, or practical responsibility, bears little similarity to the other 
 
 
16 It’s not clear that this kind of non-arbitrary indeterminism would be sufficient for the purposes of 
true moral responsibility; but this question is outside the scope of this work. 
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concepts because it’s responsibility in name only – Mary is, by stipulation, neither 
morally or legally responsible for her coming down with the disease, and she may not 
even be causally responsible in any relevant sense either. Yet it makes sense to treat Mary 
in a similar way to how we would treat Mary if she was a morally or legally responsible 
for her being a threat to others - doing so saves lives. 
 If our concepts of free will and moral responsibility are inexorably tied to 
instances where we experience apparent liberty, and compatibilists reject the veridicality 
of these experiences, then our employment of the concepts in actual and hypothetical 
situations cannot be used as evidence towards the truth of compatibilist theories of the 
concepts. Indeed, it’s not at all clear what could count as support for a compatibilist 
theory of these concepts. Fortunately, determinists are already willing to reject the 
veridicality of a large number of our experience and the beliefs founded on them, so 
abandoning the concepts of free will and moral responsibility as equally illusory 
probably wouldn’t force them to embrace a far more radical skepticism - but it would 
cause them to abandon compatibilism. 
 
 
Compatibilist Avenues of Response  
 
Thus far, I’ve argued that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility are 
inexorably tied to experiences that determinists believe fail to accurately reflect the 
world, and that to abandon the veridicality of our experiences undermines the only 
reason we have to assume the veridicality of our application of these concepts. I contend 
this leaves the compatibilist with no means to justify a compatibilist theory of either free 
will or moral responsibility, and thus compatibilism is incoherent.  
 In this section I discuss four potential responses to my argument: (1) the other 
methods approach, (2) an appeal to those lacking experiences of apparent liberty, (3) the 
alternate foundation approach, and (4) an appeal to counterexamples. 
 
(1) Other Methods  
Although the primary way analytic philosophers investigate concepts is to analyze the 
employment of the concepts, it is not the only way. For example, they might look to a 
theory’s consistency with other beliefs, or its ontological simplicity as evidence of its 
accuracy. A diligent compatibilist, then, might deny the veridicality of our application of 
the concepts of free will and moral responsibility, and yet still have a means to construct 
a robust theory about those concepts.  
 Of the four responses I look at, I believe this is the most compelling.  
Unfortunately, it is uncontroversially true that most of the leading compatibilists simply 
fail to pursue this method, and instead argue from the position that their account of the 
concepts is consistent with our commonsense application of the concepts.17 It’s also not 
 
 
17 See Fischer, ‘Responsibility and Control’; Fischer, ‘As Go the Frankfurt Examples, so Goes 
Deontic Morality’; Fischer, ‘The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument’; Fischer, ‘The Frankfurt 
Cases’; Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’; Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will 
and the Concept of a Person’; Frankfurt, ‘Some Thoughts Concerning PAP’; Hunt, ‘Moral 
Responsibility and Unavoidable Action’; Hunt, ‘Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives’; P. 
F. Strawson.  
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clear that the remaining methods open to the compatibilist are sufficient to produce a 
robust theory of these concepts. Even assuming a robust theory of either free will or 
moral responsibility could be constructed in this way, these compatibilists still have to 
argue that their theory is preferable to that of libertarian free will and true moral 
responsibility.  
 Incompatibilists who believe in the truth of universal causal determinism can 
argue that because our experience of free will is illusory, our application of these 
concepts is irrelevant; for them our application of these concepts to the actual world is 
consistent, but founded on a mistake that their compatibilist rivals already accept. 
Furthermore, if Galen Strawson is right, they’re both better off being hard incompatibilists, 
believing that these concepts are incompatible with the truth of either determinism or 
indeterminism. 
 
(2) Lack of Experiences of Apparent Liberty 
Suppose that some people honestly report that they do not experience a sensation of 
liberty of the kind Galen Strawson discusses. If this is true, these people’s concepts of free 
will and moral responsibility must be derived from something other than their personal 
experience of liberty. If their actual and hypothetical employment of the concepts is 
similar to ours, then compatibilists can argue that our concepts of free will and moral 
responsibility do not rely upon an experience of liberty, and thus that the primary 
method is sufficient for testing compatibilist theories of these concepts. 
 There are a number of problems with this response. First, it’s not clear that such 
people exist. Second, if these people regularly interact with those of us who do have 
experiences of apparent liberty, it’s possible that they get their concepts from us, and thus 
their concepts can still be based on experiences of apparent liberty. If we find a secluded 
group of human beings who report not to have the same experience of liberty as we do, 
and yet still employ concepts that had the same actual and hypothetical application as 
our concepts of free will and moral responsibility, then we will succeed in showing that 
these concepts can grounded in something other than our experience of apparent liberty. 
However, I strongly suspect that if we found such a group, they would lack any concept 
of free will and moral responsibility; although they might get along just as well by 
employing adjacent concepts like freedom from coercion and legal responsibility.   
 
(3) Alternate Foundation 
Alternatively, compatibilists might get just as far if they can offer an alternate foundation 
for our beliefs about free will and moral responsibility that is as consistent with our 
application of the concepts. Such an approach could only be a success if it could ground 
moral responsibility and free will in something other than our experience of liberty while 
still keeping these concepts distinct from adjacent concepts. 
 One of the reasons that our experiences serve as an adequate foundation for our 
concepts of free will and moral responsibility is that they are nearly inescapable; we 
almost constantly feel as though we have the authorial control Galen Strawson describes, 
and we cannot help but feel responsible for our choices in such situations. If 
compatibilists can find an alternate foundation, ideally it will be as common and 
inescapable as these experiences are. This is one of the virtues of P. F. Strawson’s theory 
of moral responsibility. P. F. Strawson claimed that rather than people being genuinely 
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morally responsible for their actions, the practice of holding people moral responsible 
played a central role in their personal relationships.18 Because personal relationships play 
a fairly large role in our lives, they are a good potential foundation for the concept of 
moral responsibility. On his view, our concept of holding people moral responsibility 
plays a regulatory role in such relationships, and can be derived from truths about such 
relationships. Setting aside the view’s prima facie inconsistencies with our linguistic 
practices, it’s not at all clear P. F. Strawson’s account of moral responsibility is anything 
but a kind of practical responsibility concerned with relationship maintenance. This is 
inherently inconsistent with our intuitions and hypothetical employment of the concept, 
such as the ones consistent with the story of heaven and hell and our intuitions about 
Mary. This inconsistency shouldn’t be surprising - practical responsibility is nothing like 
moral responsibility. While holding people morally responsible is often practical, it is not 
necessarily so, and vice versa. 
 The central problem with this approach is that a satisfactory foundation should 
be both immediately apparent and capture those aspects of our actual and hypothetical 
practices concerning free will and moral responsibility that distinguish them from 
adjacent concepts. Thus far compatibilist attempts to offer an alternate foundation have 
met with much the same problem as P. F. Strawson’s attempt, they fail to accurately 
explain our application of the concepts without appealing to what they believe is a false 
experience of liberty that would undermine the value of the compatibilist’s theory’s 
consistency with the application of the concepts. 
 
(4) Appeal to Counterexamples 
The compatibilist has one final option, I think, to defend her appeal to our application of 
the concepts of free will and moral responsibility. Unable to construct a theory of these 
concepts by way of other means, unable to find examples of people who apply the 
concepts in the same way as we do despite not having any contact with an experience of 
apparent liberty, and unable to offer an alternative foundation for our application of the 
concepts, the compatibilist might be able to construct a counterexample to my claim that 
our concepts are founded on our experience of apparent liberty.19  If the compatibilist can 
do so, they can argue that our experience of apparent liberty is no better a foundation for 
our concepts than alternative compatibilist foundations, and thus the concepts are, once 
again, up for grabs.   
 Daniel Dennett cites such an apparent case, the story of Martin Luther who, when 
pressured to recant his writings, refused and is often quoted as saying that he ‘could do 
no other’.20 Luther is prima facie morally responsible for his actions, but if we take his 
purported description of events literally, he lacked the experience of feeling as though he 
could do otherwise. 
 
 
18 P. F. Strawson. 
19 Many compatibilists already construct cases where someone is said to be prima facie morally 
responsible despite being wholly causally determined or lacking alternate possibilities. For 
instance, see Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’; Frankfurt, ‘Some 
Thoughts Concerning PAP’; Fischer, ‘Responsibility and Control’; Fischer, ‘As Go the Frankfurt 
Examples, so Goes Deontic Morality’; Fischer, ‘The Frankfurt Cases’; and Hunt, ‘Moral 
Responsibility and Unavoidable Action’; Hunt, ‘Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives’. 
20 Martin Luther, quoted in Dennett, p. 133. 
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 I cannot purport to know how Luther felt; but I do know that we often make 
similar statements about our own actions, despite their being accompanied by an 
experience of apparent liberty. For example, when the right thing to do is obvious, it 
makes sense to say ‘I wouldn’t do otherwise’ or ‘I couldn’t do otherwise.’ Although the 
latter might be, strictly speaking, false, both serve to convey my dedication to doing 
what’s right and to reassure my audience that they don’t need to worry about me doing 
the wrong thing.21  
 However, if we take this quote literally, it would be quite odd to say that he was, 
in fact, praiseworthy for his actions. Even though he did the prima facie right thing, it’s not 
at all clear that it would make sense to reward Luther with an eternity in heaven for 
something that was outside of his control. Of course, independent of questions of 
Luther’s moral responsibility, it is practical to hold him up as an example of how one 
should behave when confronted with adversity - and this is true whether his actions were 
his own, or caused by divine intervention. 
 I discuss this approach last because I believe it is the least attractive option the 
compatibilist has. I’ve argued that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility are 
inexorably tied to our experiences of apparent liberty; but if determinist compatibilists 
are in doubt about this claim, they cannot deny that these same experiences generate 
beliefs about our capacities that, qua determinists, they believe to be false. The 
determinist accepts that there can be massive error not only in our experiences, but in our 
belief sets as well. If our beliefs are so untrustworthy with regard to our capabilities, it 
would be quite odd if compatibilists were willing to balance the acceptability of pursuing 
compatibilism on the veridicality of rare experiences like that of Martin Luther’s. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Compatibilists believe that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with our 
being wholly causally determined to act by circumstances outside of our control.  
Invariably, compatibilists appeal to their theories’ compatibility with our application of 
these concepts to actual and hypothetical situations. However it seems as though our 
experience of liberty is inescapable, such that even the most dedicated determinist cannot 
help but feel as if they are capable of acting other than they actually do, and being truly 
morally responsible such that it is appropriate to hold them morally responsible for their 
actions even when there is no practical benefit to doing so. I contend that this experience 
of apparent liberty is the foundation of our concepts of free will and moral responsibility.  
Both compatibilist and incompatibilist alike are apt to say that when we experience such 
apparent liberty, we are likely both acting free and morally responsible for our actions. If 
this is the case, when compatibilists reject the veridicality of such experiences, they 
undermine the only reason they have to believe the concepts of free will and moral 
 
 
21 Frankfurt discusses how we sometimes say that we can’t do otherwise when we’re faced with a 
coercive threat (Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’). Frankfurt believes 
that genuine coercion requires one to lack freedom of the will and be forced to act by the coercive 
threat, but coerced agents rarely report a genuine lack of the experience of liberty; rather the threat 
is so coercive that they have prima facie strong reasons to act as the coercer intends them to.  
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responsibility are applicable to the actual world. As a result, determinist compatibilist 
theories of free will and moral responsibility are incoherent. 
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